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Abstract
Voluntary insurance contracts constitute a puzzle because they increase
the expectation value of one party’s wealth, whereas both parties must sign
for such contracts to exist. Classically, the puzzle is resolved by introducing
non-linear utility functions, which encode asymmetric risk preferences; or by
assuming the parties have asymmetric information. Here we show the puz-
zle goes away if contracts are evaluated by their effect on the time-average
growth rate of wealth. Our solution assumes only knowledge of wealth dy-
namics. Time averages and expectation values differ because wealth changes
are non-ergodic. Our reasoning is generalisable: business happens when both
parties grow faster.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Conceptual background
This study was motivated by an observation by Kenneth Arrow, articulated at the
30-year anniversary symposium of the Santa Fe Institute in 2014. Arrow listed as
one significant weakness of general competitive equilibrium theory its inability to
provide a satisfactory answer to the question: why do insurance contracts exist?
Since financial derivatives – a form of insurance – constitute the largest market on
earth, the existing answers, he claimed, are not good enough. Even in the modern
insurance literature, explaining the existence of insurance contracts has been iden-
tified as central to “explain[ing] the ‘raison d’eˆtre’ of the insurance industry” (Van
Cayseele, 1992, p. 241).
The conventional economic explanations for why insurance exists are asymmetric
information, risk aversion, and irrationality. Here we provide an alternative expla-
nation whose basis is dynamics: activities resembling insurance are likely to emerge
whenever multiple entities are faced with managing resources in an environment of
noisy non-additive growth.
In the 17th century people concerned with economic problems developed prob-
abilistic mathematical reasoning (Devlin, 2008). Part of this innovation was the
invention of the expectation value. It was explicitly assumed that an individual will
make decisions to optimise the rate of change of the expectation value of his wealth.
We call this model of human behaviour the “expected-wealth paradigm.” Implicit in
this paradigm is the ergodic hypothesis that the expectation value reflects what hap-
pens over a long time.1 We now know that this equivalence holds only under special
conditions, the study of which is known as ergodic theory. Growth processes gener-
ally violate these conditions. A comprehensive discussion of the ergodic hypothesis
in decision theory can be found in (Peters and Gell-Mann, 2016).
It is helpful to delineate the physical meaning of the expectation value. It is
the average over an infinitely large ensemble of identically prepared systems, real or
imagined, that evolve randomly into the future. This characterisation motivates the
question: why would an individual optimise such a quantity? A priori the many
systems embedded in the expectation value are not accessible to the individual,
so there is no good reason for him to maximise it. This constitutes a conceptual
1A rare example of this belief being stated explicitly in the context of decision theory is in
(Chernoff and Moses, 1959, p.98): “If a gamble is favorable from the point of view of the expectation
value and you have the choice of repeating it many times, then it is wise to do so. For eventually,
your amount of money [is] bound to increase.” The ergodic hypothesis is more frequently explicit
in the study of economic inequality, see (Berman et al., 2017) and references therein.
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challenge of the axioms of the expected-wealth paradigm.
Historically, the expected-wealth paradigm was first challenged by N. Bernoulli
in his famous 1713 letter to Montmort (Montmort, 1713), whose contents became
known as the “St. Petersburg paradox.” The conclusion was inescapable: human
behaviour does not optimise the expectation value of wealth. This is an empirical
challenge to the paradigm.
The challenge was answered by the development of the expected utility hypoth-
esis by Cramer and D. Bernoulli (Bernoulli, 1738). It aims to capture the difference
between observed behaviour and that predicted by expected wealth maximisation
by converting money non-linearly into “utility.” The conversion is specified so that
people maximise the expectation value of utility. Note that the key axiom – that an
expectation value is being maximised – remained in place. A utility function was
sought that would describe human behaviour within the existing conceptual space,
and the resulting formalism is first and foremost descriptive and phenomenological.
The conceptual maturity of expected-utility theory is limited by the concepts avail-
able at the time of its development.2 Crucially, these concepts do not include the
question central in ergodic theory, whether expectation values reflect what happens
in reality over a long time.
We question directly the meaningfulness of expectation values by dropping the er-
godic hypothesis. Since we identify what happens over time as the relevant question,
for the remainder of this paper we call our approach the “time paradigm.”
Some 200 years after the invention of quantitative probabilistic reasoning, the
“ergodicity question” arose: do expectation values reflect what happens over time?
Are the ups and downs in a fluctuating quantity equivalent in the long run to the
quantity sitting at its expectation value? The well-known answer is no. In general,
if we’re interested in the long-time effect of fluctuations we must explicitly include
time in our models and compute time-averages of the quantities of interest. Only
in special cases, in which these quantities are ergodic, can we rely on expectation
values being indicative of long-time behaviour.
This is significant in many economic problems. Economics tends to deal with
growth processes, for example in personal wealth or national income. Growing quan-
tities cannot be ergodic but it may be possible to construct observables, such as
growth rates, whose time averages equal their expectation values (Peters and Gell-
Mann, 2016). This possibility is not guaranteed: the relevant ergodic properties must
be demonstrated, not assumed, for each observable we wish to analyse with methods
reliant on ergodicity.
2We consider the 1944 axiomatisation of expected utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944) a mathematical refinement rather than a conceptual renewal of the original ideas.
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Intuition resting on the assumption that things behave over time just as they
behave in a statistically stationary ensemble is misleading here. As we shall see
in the present context, this flawed intuition makes insurance contracts appear as
zero-sum games that benefit only one party. By eliminating the ergodic assumption,
insurance contracts – and by extension other business deals – appear as win-win
situations that benefit both parties.
1.2 The insurance puzzle and two treatments
We revisit the question of why insurance contracts exist, unresolved in the expected-
wealth paradigm. The issues at hand are ostensibly about insurance, interesting
from the perspectives of both actuarial science and decision theory. Through deci-
sion theory their relevance extends to much of formal economics. For instance, the
trivial extension from insurance contracts to financial derivatives demonstrates the
significance of the time paradigm for modern financial markets.
1.2.1 The problem with insurance in the expected-wealth paradigm
Let us be clear about what the expected-wealth paradigm is.
The expected-wealth paradigm is a model of human behaviour. It posits that humans
act to maximise the rate of change of the expectation value of their wealth.
It predicts the absence of insurance contracts as follows:
1. To be profitable, an insurer has to charge an insurance premium greater than
the expectation value of any claims that may be made against it, called the
“net premium,” (Kaas et al., 2008, p. 1).
2. The insurance buyer therefore has to be willing to pay more than the net
premium so that an insurance contract may be successfully signed.
3. Under the expected-wealth paradigm it is irrational for the buyer to pay more
than the net premium, and therefore insurance contracts should not exist.
An insurance contract can only ever be beneficial to one party. It has the anti-
symmetric property that the expectation value of the gain of one party is the expec-
tation value of the loss of the other party. From this perspective, it is a zero-sum
game.
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1.2.2 Treatment 1 – the utility paradigm
(Bernoulli, 1738) identified the rationality model in step 3 above as problematic and
devised the utility paradigm. He observed that money may not translate linearly
into usefulness and assigned to any individual an idiosyncratic utility function U(W )
that maps wealth W into usefulness U , which he posited as the true quantity whose
expected change is maximised in a decision.
The utility paradigm is another model of human behaviour. It posits that humans
act to maximise the rate of change of the expectation value of their utility.
Since the utility function of the insurance buyer may be non-linear, it is possible
that the buyer experiences a positive change in the expectation value of his utility
from signing an insurance contract, even if the expectation value of his monetary
wealth decreases. Therefore, the utility paradigm does not rule out the existence of
insurance contracts. It does not share the anti-symmetric property of the expected-
wealth paradigm. The expectation value of the gain of utility of one party need not
be the expectation value of the loss of utility of the other party.
In fact, since different people have different wealths or different utility functions
or both, the change in the expectation value of utility experienced by one party is
almost unrestricted by the change experienced by the other party. This is problematic
and led Kelly Jr. (1956, p. 918) to comment that the utility paradigm is “too general
to shed any light on the specific problems”. The paradigm affords too much freedom
by appealing to individual differences and by allowing too broad a class of utility
functions. As in any paradigm, generality comes at the expense of predictive power.
In the case of the utility paradigm, the predictive power is often limited to the point
of practical uselessness. Utility theory dominates formal economics but plays no
major role in practical actuarial work, where limiting the likelihood of the insurer’s
insolvency is the paradigmatic idea.3
1.2.3 Treatment 2 – the time paradigm
In agreement with Bernoulli we take issue with step 3 of Section 1.2.1. It does indeed
imply an inappropriate model of rationality. But the correction we propose is entirely
different from Bernoulli’s in its epistemology.
3This approach, known as ruin theory, originated outside economics at the start of the 20th cen-
tury (Lundberg, 1903) and remained there. Indeed, Arrow (1971, p. 134) remarked that “Insurance
is an item of considerable importance in the economies of advanced nations, yet it is fair to say that
economic theorists have had little to say about it, and insurance theory has developed with virtually
no reference to the basic economic concepts of utility and productivity.”
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The time paradigm is another model of human behaviour. It posits that humans act
to maximise the long-time rate of change of their wealth.
The time-average growth rate of wealth under reasonable dynamics (the standard
being multiplicative dynamics) behaves very differently from the rate of change of
the expectation value of wealth. This is because the appropriate growth rate for a
given dynamic must take into account the non-linearity of the process. Typically
there exists a range of prices where time-average growth rates increase for both
parties when an insurance contract is signed. From this perspective, reasonably
priced insurance contracts are win-win deals.
Without appealing to utility functions, the time paradigm predicts the existence
of insurance contracts with deep conceptual consequences.
2 Theory and calculation
2.1 A shipping example
We use the most basic model of an insurance contract, considered e.g. by (Rothschild
and Stiglitz, 1976). The model is chosen because it is simple and has all the necessary
elements to demonstrate the failure of the expected-wealth paradigm and the different
fixes under the utility paradigm and under the time paradigm. (Bernoulli, 1738)
applied the model in the context of shipping, and we will do the same for illustration.4
To make the model more concrete and demonstrate that it works in a practically
interesting regime, we use example values for its parameters.
A St. Petersburg merchant sends a ship to Amsterdam. Upon the safe arrival of
the ship the merchant will make a gain of G = $4, 000. However, with probability
p = 0.05 the ship, whose replacement cost is C = $30, 000, will be lost. The journey
is known to take ∆t = 1 month. The shipowner’s wealth when the ship sets sail
at time t is Wown = $100, 000. An insurer proposes a contract stipulating that,
should the ship be lost, the shipowner shall receive the replacement cost of the ship
and his lost profit, L = G + C, for an insurance fee of F = $1, 800. If the two
parties sign the contract the shipowner will receive G − F with certainty after one
month, whereas the insurer will receive F with probability 1−p and lose L−F with
probability p. The contract is completely specified by the insured loss L and the fee
F (and the payout condition, of course). We assume that both parties have perfect
information, i.e. both know the true probability of the ship being lost, and that
4The main focus of (Bernoulli, 1738), the St. Petersburg paradox, was resolved using the time
paradigm in (Peters, 2011a).
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there is no possibility of fraud or default. Should the shipowner sign the insurance
contract, and did the insurer act in his own interest by proposing it?
2.2 The expected-wealth paradigm and its problems
The expected-wealth paradigm, in the language of economics, assumes that humans
are risk neutral, i.e. they have no preference between gambles whose expected changes
in wealth over a given time interval are identical. This assumption has been known to
be flawed at least since 1713 (Montmort, 1713, p. 402). We discuss it here to better
understand the origin of the utility paradigm and enable a conceptually different
approach. Under the expected-wealth paradigm humans act to maximise the rate of
change of the expectation value of their wealth:5
〈r〉 = 〈∆W 〉
∆t
=
〈W (t+ ∆t)〉 −W (t)
∆t
. (1)
The attractiveness of an insurance contract is judged by computing the change in
〈r〉 that results from signing the contract.
The shipowner’s perspective
Without insurance, the rate of change of the expectation value of the shipowner’s
wealth is
〈r〉unown =
(1− p)G− pC
∆t
=
G− pL
∆t
, (2)
or $2, 300 per month using the example parameters.
With insurance the certain rate of change of the shipowner’s wealth is
〈r〉inown =
G− F
∆t
. (3)
In the example this is $2, 200 per month.
The change in the rate of change of the expectation value of the shipowner’s
wealth resulting from entering into the insurance contract is
δ 〈r〉own = 〈r〉inown − 〈r〉unown =
pL− F
∆t
, (4)
5We denote by 〈x〉 the expectation value of a random variable, x, and define it as the average
over infinitely many independent realistions: 〈x〉 ≡ limN→∞
{
1
N
∑N
i=1 xi
}
.
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here −$100 per month. This change is marked by δ rather than ∆ to clarify that it
is not the change over ∆t of a time-varying quantity.
Buying insurance in this example reduces the rate of change of the expectation
value of the shipowner’s wealth. Hence, the shipowner should not sign the contract
according to the expected-wealth paradigm.
The insurer’s perspective
Without insurance, the certain rate of change of the insurer’s wealth is
〈r〉unins = 0, (5)
since the insurer does no business.
With insurance, the rate of change of the expectation value of the insurer’s wealth
is
〈r〉inins =
F − pL
∆t
, (6)
or +$100 per month in the example.
The change in the rate of change of the expectation value of the insurer’s wealth
resulting from entering into the contract is
δ 〈r〉ins = 〈r〉inins − 〈r〉unins =
F − pL
∆t
, (7)
here +$100 per month. Hence the insurer should sign the contract according to the
expected-wealth paradigm. But since the shipowner should not sign, no deal will be
made.
Crucially, irrespective of the parameter values, what the insurer gains is always
precisely what the shipowner loses. Comparing equation (4) and equation (7), we
see that
δ 〈r〉ins = −δ 〈r〉own . (8)
This anti-symmetry makes insurance a fundamentally unsavoury business – a zero-
sum game where one party wins at the expense of the other. The existence of such
contracts in the real world requires asymmetries between the contracting parties:
buyer and seller may have different access to information; they may make different
subjective assessments of the risk being insured (encoded in their estimates of model
parameters such as p and L); or they may deceive, coerce, or gull the other party
into the necessary sub-optimal decision. We consider this
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〈r〉 Shipowner Insurer
insured 〈r〉inown = G−F∆t 〈r〉inins = F−pL∆t
uninsured 〈r〉unown = (1−p)G−pC∆t 〈r〉unins = 0
difference δ 〈r〉own = pL−F∆t δ 〈r〉ins = −δ 〈r〉own =
F−pL
∆t
Table 1: Changes in the rates of change of the expectation value of wealth for
shipowner and insurer. None of the expressions contains the wealth of either party.
The problem with the expected-wealth paradigm:
No price exists that makes an insurance contract beneficial to both
parties, and yet insurance contracts exist.
We summarise the two perspectives in Table 2.2 and illustrate the effect in Fig-
ure 1.
2.3 Solution in the utility paradigm
The model of human decision making of the expected-wealth paradigm predicts
that insurance contracts do not exist. This is in disagreement with observations.
D. Bernoulli concluded that humans use a different criterion when deciding whether
to sign insurance contracts (Bernoulli, 1738). He introduced a non-linear mapping of
money, declaring: if humans don’t act to maximise the expectation value of money,
then let’s say they act to maximise the expectation value of some sub-linearly in-
creasing function of money. He called this function the “utility function” and left
it largely unspecified, using the logarithm in computations and pointing out that
it produces essentially the same results as a square root function.6 In effect, the
6(Bernoulli, 1738) is credited with computing changes in the expectation values of utility func-
tions although a careful reading of his work shows that he computed something slightly different
(Peters, 2011a). The difference was small in his context, and later researchers assumed he had
meant to compute changes in expectation values (Laplace, 1814, p. 439–442).
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Figure 1: Change in the rate of change of the expectation value of wealth result-
ing from signing an insurance contract versus insurance fee. Solid line: shipowner.
Dashed line: insurer. The straight lines of opposite slopes cross at zero, meaning
that there is no price where both lines lie above the zero line – the winning party
only gains at the expense of the losing party. The vertical dotted line indicates the
proposed insurance fee, which appears attractive to the insurer and unattractive to
the shipowner. Inset: horizontal range extended to $100,000.
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idiosyncrasies of human beings and their circumstances were invoked. A dollar to a
rich man has a value different from a dollar to a poor man; some people like gambling,
others are more prudent.
This approach does not so much resolve the puzzle as provide a description in
mathematical terms that is consistent with a description in everyday language: the
expected-wealth paradigm does not work. The introduction of a non-linear utility
function breaks the equality of the locations of zero-crossings of the value of the in-
surance contract for both parties. It is this equality that makes insurance impossible
in the expected-wealth paradigm. Any perturbation that breaks it and creates a win-
win range of fees suffices to solve the mathematical problem. Introducing non-linear
utility functions, perhaps different for shipowner and insurer, constitutes such a per-
turbation. An example is shown in Figure 2, where utility is given by the square-root
of wealth, U(W ) =
√
W (the first ever utility function to be suggested, by Cramer in
a 1728 letter cited by (Bernoulli, 1738)). A more satisfying resolution of the puzzle
would explain the rationale behind such a perturbation. Why a square-root? Why
a logarithm? Why re-value money at all?
In this paradigm we consider the rate of change of the expectation value of utility,
〈ru〉 = 〈∆U〉
∆t
=
〈U(t+ ∆t)〉 − U(t)
∆t
. (9)
Again using the shipping example, the equations corresponding to those in Sec-
tion 2.2 are as follows.
The shipowner’s perspective
Without insurance, the rate of change of the expectation value of the shipowner’s
utility is
〈ru〉unown =
(1− p)Uown(Wown +G) + pUown(Wown − C)− U(Wown)
∆t
. (10)
This quantity is measured in “utils” per unit time, with the dimension util dependent
on the utility function.7 With the example parameter values and square-root utility
this is 3.37 utils per month.
7The fact that the util is a dimension imposes restrictions on the utility function that are
not generally recognised. Barenblatt (2003, p. 17 ff.) shows that any dimension function of any
physically meaningful quantity, such as money, must be a power-law monomial, which restricts
utility functions themselves to power-law monomials. This is a failure of the utility paradigm as it is
often presented. The interpretation of ln(W ) alone as a physically meaningful quantity is untenable
– it should only ever occur as ln(W 1) − ln(W 2) = ln(W 1/W 2), where utils cancel out and the
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Figure 2: Change in the rate of change of the expectation value of square-root util-
ity resulting from signing an insurance contract versus insurance fee. Solid line:
shipowner. Dashed line: insurer. The vertical dotted line indicates the proposed in-
surance fee. Shaded region: Introducing the non-linear utility function is a sufficient
perturbation to create a regime where both parties gain. Both the solid and dashed
lines are above the zero line here. However, the non-linear function is ill-constrained
by the formalism, which limits predictive power. Inset: horizontal axis extended to
$100,000. The non-linearity is clearly visible at these scales.
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With insurance the (certain) rate of change of utility is
〈ru〉inown =
Uown(Wown +G− F )− Uown(Wown)
∆t
, (11)
or 3.46 utils per month with square-root utility.
The change in the rate of change of the expectation value of the shipowner’s
utility resulting from entering into the insurance contract is
δ 〈ru〉own = 〈ru〉inown − 〈ru〉unown , (12)
or 0.094 utils per month with square-root utility. In the example with square-root
utility the shipowner should sign the contract, according to the utility paradigm.
Depending on the shipowner’s utility function, Uown, and his wealth, Wown, buy-
ing insurance may increase or decrease the rate of change of the expectation value of
his utility, with the result that the utility paradigm cannot say whether the contract
should be signed or not. For almost 300 years this has been the celebrated classic
resolution of the puzzle: since utility theory doesn’t know what to do, it does not
explicitly rule out the existence of insurance contracts.
The insurer’s perspective
It has been said that the utility paradigm applies to individuals only, and not
to companies. For example, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976, p. 631) write: “It is less
straight-forward to describe how insurance companies decide which contracts they
offer for sale [...]. We assume that companies are risk neutral and that they are
concerned only with expected profits.” They continue in footnote 3: “the theory of
the firm behaviour under uncertainty is one of the more unsettled areas of economic
theory, we cannot look to it for the sort of support [...] which the large body of
literature devoted to the expected utility theorem provides.”
For reasons that will become clear in Sections 2.4 and 3, we don’t follow Roth-
schild and Stiglitz (1976). Instead, we assign a utility function to the insurer, a
procedure followed by Bernoulli (1738). To do this we assign to the insurer a large
wealth, Wins = $1, 000, 000. We simply treat the insurer as an individual, albeit with
considerable means, and leave unspecified whether this is a natural person, a firm,
or some other entity.
logarithm is taken of dimensionless quantities only. We note that von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944) pointed out that only differences between utilities may be considered meaningful, which
avoids the problem.
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〈ru〉 Shipowner Insurer
insured Uown(Wown+G−F )−Uown(Wown)
∆t
(1−p)Uins(Wins+F )+pUins(Wins+F−L)−Uins(Wins)
∆t
uninsured (1−p)Uown(Wown+G)+pUown(Wown−C)−U(Wown)
∆t
0
difference Uown(Wown+G−F )−(1−p)Uown(Wown+G)−pUown(Wown−C)
∆t
(1−p)Uins(Wins+F )+pUins(Wins+F−L)−Uins(Wins)
∆t
Table 2: Changes in the expectation value of utility for shipowner and insurer
Without insurance, then, the (certain) rate of change of the insurer’s utility is
〈ru〉unins = 0 (13)
(the insurer does no business).
With insurance, the rate of change of the expectation value of the insurer’s utility
is
〈ru〉inins =
(1− p)Uins(Wins + F ) + pUins(Wins + F − L)− Uins(Wins)
∆t
, (14)
or 0.043 utils per month with square-root utility.
The change in the rate of change of the expectation value of the insurer’s utility
resulting from entering into the contract is
δ 〈ru〉ins = 〈ru〉inins − 〈ru〉unins , (15)
0.043 utils per month with square-root utility. The different perspectives are sum-
marised in Table 2.3. Without specifying the utility functions the utility paradigm
only makes weak predictions of behavioural consistency, based on assumed mono-
tonicity (more money is better) and concavity (risk aversion) of the utility functions,
as famously shown by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).
2.4 Solution in the time paradigm
2.4.1 Introducing time – 20th- vs. 17th-century mathematics
As Peters (2011b) has argued, changes in the expectation value of wealth are not
a priori relevant to an individual. The expectation value is a mathematical object
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that has nice linearity properties which make it convenient for computations, but
mathematical convenience is no reason for the object to be relevant. The physical
operation that the expectation value encodes is this: take all possible events (the ship
is lost or not), and create an ensemble of systems in numbers proportional to the
probabilities of the events that occur in them. For example, create 100 systems. Let
the ship travel safely in 95 of them and let it be lost in the other five. Now take the
different owners’ wealths in all of these systems, pool them, and share them equally
among the owners. In this setup, each shipowner receives with certainty G − pL,
i.e. his gain minus the net premium.8
Strictly speaking, this operation is an average over parallel universes (the different
systems). Less strictly speaking, the operation corresponds to a large group of owners
who make a contract with each other, whereby, at the end of the month, all wealths
are pooled together, and shared equally.9
Thus, the operation of taking the expectation value is in essence the operation of
signing an insurance contract – a perfect contract, no less, where all risk is eliminated
and the premium is the net premium. No wonder, then, that in the expected-wealth
paradigm there is no good reason for signing an insurance contract – mathematically,
this has already happened!
Whichever way one chooses to conceptualise the expectation value, the central
message should be clear: the rate of change of an individual’s expected wealth bears
no resemblance to, and is therefore a poor model of, how his wealth will evolve over
time. The two mental pictures – many parallel cooperating trajectories versus a
single trajectory unfolding over a long period – are at odds. In general we cannot
equate the performance of expectation values with the performance of a single system
over time.
With this knowledge we can revisit the problem: clearly, an individual shipowner
will not come to sensible conclusions if he compares his expectation value without
buying insurance (which looks like he has signed a perfect insurance contract at the
minimum fee that could possibly be offered) to his expectation value with buying
insurance (which must be worse unless the insurer has made a mistake). As we will
see, he will come to sensible conclusions if he uses the time-average growth rate of
his wealth as a decision criterion.
8We note similarities between this imagined setup and the practice – now known as the “general
average” – developed around 800 BC by the inhabitants of Rhodes, where losses arising from the
partial jettisoning of cargo at sea were ”made good by the assessment of all [. . . ] for the benefit of
all” (Scott, 1932, p. 164).
9See (Peters and Adamou, 2015) for a discussion of the same operation, carried out repeatedly,
in the context of the evolution of cooperation.
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2.4.2 Solution
Having argued that the treatment that led to the insurance puzzle is invalid because
it assumes that humans optimise over imagined copies of themselves in parallel uni-
verses, it remains to show that the alternative treatment resolves the puzzle. To be
specific: the alternative treatment is a different model of human decision making.
The traditional models say that humans make decisions by optimising the expecta-
tion values of their wealth or utility. Our model says that humans make decisions by
optimising the time-average growth rates of their wealth. For concreteness we assume
multiplicative dynamics.10 Which model of human behaviour is better is only partly
an empirical question.11 Our model seems a priori more plausible to us because it
does not introduce parallel universes, and because it resembles mechanistically the
real-world scenario it seeks to reflect. It is empirically strong because it resolves the
insurance puzzle, and conceptually strong because all elements of the solution have
clear physical significance.
Both the utility paradigm and the time paradigm consider the problem as it
is stated to be underspecified. The utility paradigm assumes that people mentally
convert money non-linearly into usefulness and then average arithmetically over all
possible imagined outcomes; the time paradigm assumes that people mentally con-
sider the future beyond the end of the single cargo shipment and are interested in
the growth of their wealth. Neither assumption is stated in the problem and each
leads to a different type of solution, in which different choices must be made about
the necessary additional information.
This additional information corresponds to introducing an axiom. The time
paradigm axiomatically assumes a stochastic dynamic of wealth. The utility paradigm
axiomatically assumes a utility function. The utility function, which encodes human
behaviour is further down the deductive chain – it can be derived from the dynamic.
Therefore the time paradigm operates at a deeper level, and solutions in the time
paradigm must be considered more fundamental. Another advantage of the time
paradigm is that its axioms are more readily amenable to empirical verification: it
is relatively easy to find out to what extent wealth is described by some dynamical
10Multiplicative dynamics is a simple and robust null model that solves the problem. We note
that our treatment is not restricted to this special case but for clarity of exposition we refrain from
a more comprehensive treatment.
11We explicitly disagree with (Friedman, 1953) on this point: the faithful reproduction of observed
behaviour, even the successful prediction of not-yet observed behaviour, does not absolve a model
from the requirement of using reasonable assumptions. Prediction and understanding are not the
same thing. Rosenblueth and Wiener (1945, p. 316) point out that “Not all scientific questions are
directly amenable to experiment.”
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model, whereas it is difficult to assess the value humans ascribe psychologically to
changes in their wealth.
The time paradigm postulates that humans optimise the time-average growth
rate of their wealth. The usual procedure for computing such a time average is to
first transform wealth in such a way as to generate an ergodic observable and then
compute the expectation value of that observable. Being the expectation value of an
ergodic observable, this will be the time average growth rate (Peters and Gell-Mann,
2016). Assuming multiplicative repetition, the time average growth rate is
g¯ = lim
k→∞
1
k∆t
ln
(
W (t+ k∆t)
W (t)
)
=
〈∆ lnW 〉
∆t
=
〈lnW (t+ ∆t)〉 − lnW (t)
∆t
, (16)
where the equality holds with probability 1. Equation (16) is simply the expectation
value of the exponential growth rate, which is an ergodic observable that converges
to a simple number under multiplicative dynamics, see (Gray, 2009, Chapter 7.7) for
further discussion. Intriguingly, equation (16) is identical to equation (9) if we use
logarithmic utility. Note that it is unnecessary to assume different utility functions
for shipowner and insurer. The same logarithmic utility function for both makes
the contract appear attractive to both according to the utility paradigm. This cor-
responds to both parties being subjected to the same dynamics. It turns out that
utility functions correspond to specific dynamics, and the logarithm is twinned with
multiplicative dynamics – the most ubiquitous dynamic in growing and evolving sys-
tems. The two paradigms are fundamentally different, however. For instance, in the
utility paradigm if observed behaviour is found to be incompatible with logarithmic
utility, the investigation ends. One simply concludes that the actors involved have a
different utility function, but this does not point the way to a deeper understanding
of the processes involved. On the other hand, in the time paradigm, if observed
behaviour is found to be incompatible with multiplicative dynamics, this prompts
the question whether the prevailing dynamic may be a different one and why that
may be, or whether the actor may be making bad decisions.
Once more we go through the two parties’ perspectives.
The shipowner’s perspective
Without insurance, the time-average growth rate, under multiplicative dynamics,
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of the shipowner’s wealth is
g¯unown =
1
∆t
(
(1− p) ln
(
Wown +G
Wown
)
+ p ln
(
Wown − C
Wown
))
, (17)
or 1.9% per month in our example.
With insurance, the time-average growth rate is
g¯inown =
1
∆t
ln
(
Wown +G− F
Wown
)
, (18)
namely 2.2% per month in our example.
The change in the shipowner’s time-average growth rate of wealth, resulting from
entering into the insurance contract, is
δg¯own = g¯
in
own − g¯unown, (19)
here +0.24% per month.
Hence, the shipowner should sign the contract, according to the time paradigm.
The rate of change of the expectation value of the shipowner’s wealth decreases,
equation (4), but that’s irrelevant because the shipowner is not an ensemble of own-
ers sharing resources.
The insurer’s perspective
The only difference between the insurer and the shipowner (apart from being at
opposite sides of the contract) is in their wealths. Let’s assume, as in Section 2.3, that
the insurer’s wealth is Wins = $1, 000, 000, namely ten times that of the shipowner.
Without insurance, the time-average growth rate of the insurer’s wealth is
g¯unins = 0 (20)
because the insurer has no business.
With insurance, the time-average growth rate of the insurer’s wealth is
g¯inins =
1
∆t
(
(1− p) ln
(
Wins + F
Wins
)
+ p ln
(
Wins + F − L
Wins
))
, (21)
or 0.0071% per month in our example. The difference in time-average growth rates
for the insurer is
δg¯ins = g¯
in
ins − g¯unins, (22)
here +0.0071% per month. Hence, in the time paradigm not only the shipowner but
also the insurer should sign the contract. We consider this
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g¯ Shipowner Insurer
insured 1
∆t
ln
(
Wown+G−F
Wown
)
1
∆t
[
(1− p) ln
(
Wins+F
Wins
)
+ p ln
(
Wins+F−L
Wins
)]
uninsured 1
∆t
[
(1− p) ln
(
Wown+G
Wown
)
+ p ln
(
Wown−C
Wown
)]
0
difference 1
∆t
[
ln
(
Wown+G−F
(Wown+G)(1−p)(Wown−C)p
)]
1
∆t
ln
(
(Wins+F )
(1−p)(Wins+F−L)p
Wins
)
Table 3: Time-average growth rates for shipowner and insurer
The fundamental solution to the insurance puzzle:
Both the shipowner and the insurer should sign the insurance con-
tract, because this increases the time-average growth rates of both of
their wealths.
This is consistent both with the observed existence of insurance contracts and
with human instincts about risk mitigation. It echoes Arrow’s general observation
that “there is always the simple justification for any contract freely arrived at between
two individuals: if both of them choose to enter the contract, then both of them must
be better off” (Arrow, 1971, p. 137).
Because we’ve assumed the mental model of the dynamics to be purely multi-
plicative, only the relative risks matter: L, F , G and C only appear as proportions
of current wealth Wown or Wins. In this sense the value of a dollar is indeed inversely
proportional to the wealth of the decision maker, as (Bernoulli, 1738) suggested on
intuitive grounds. However, in the time paradigm the value of a dollar is given by
the dynamic (the mode of repetition of the venture), not by psychology.
The insurance contract is seen to be beneficial to the shipowner and to the insurer
– a mathematical impossibility under the expected-wealth paradigm. By taking time
averages we find that the contract is a win-win situation, not a zero-sum game. This is
possible because both parties are part of a non-stationary growth process. The utility
paradigm often treats firms and individuals separately, see our quotes of (Rothschild
and Stiglitz, 1976) in Section 2.3, but this is not necessary. We summarise the two
perspectives in Table 2.4.2, and illustrate the effect in Figure 3.
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Unlike in Table 2.2, the bottom row of Table 2.4.2 is not anti-symmetric – the
change in time-average growth rate that the shipowner experiences when the contract
is signed is not the negative of the insurer’s change. A price range exists where
both parties gain from entering into the contract. Here systemic risk is reduced
and systemic growth supported: both parties will do better in the long run, which
constitutes an explanation of the existence of an insurance market.
3 Discussion – convergence to the expectation value
in the large wealth limit
The time solution to the insurance puzzle can also be presented by considering the
typical situation of an actual insurance company, such as a car insurer. Such a com-
pany may insure millions of cars, and therefore have access to a real-world ensemble
that has nothing to do with parallel universes, just different cars.
If the pool of insured cars is large enough, the rate at which the insurer loses
money to claims will be well described by the net premium, (F − pL)/∆t. This
thought connects the time paradigm to the expected-wealth paradigm. Imagine
an insurer whose wealth is much larger than any individual insured loss and any
individual premium. In this case δg¯ins of equation (22) due to a single contract can
be approximated by the first term of a Taylor expansion
δg¯ins =
1
∆t
[
(1− p) ln
(
1 +
F
Wins
)
+ p ln
(
1 +
F − L
Wins
)]
=
1
∆t
[
F − pL
Wins
+ o
(
F
Wins
,
F − L
Wins
)]
, (23)
where we have used little-o notation. Multiplying the first-order term of equation (23)
with Wins (an irrelevant constant at this order) yields exactly δ 〈r〉ins of equation (7).
In other words, as the risk that is being insured becomes negligible to the insurer,
the predictions of the time paradigm for the insurer’s behaviour become increasingly
similar to those of the expectation-value paradigm. The two mathematical models
of human behaviour are identical in this limit, just as the models of Newtonian and
Einsteinian mechanics are identical in the limit of small velocities, or the models
of classical and quantum mechanics are identical in the limit as Planck’s constant
approaches zero (the “Correspondence Principle”). Similar behaviour was noted in
the context of leveraged investments in continuous time: in the small-leverage limit,
the rate of fractional changes of the expectation value converges to the time-average
exponential growth rate (Peters, 2011a).
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Figure 3: Change in time-average growth rate resulting from signing an insurance
contract versus insurance fee. Solid line: shipowner. Dashed line: insurer. The verti-
cal dotted line indicates the proposed insurance fee. Shaded region: Averaging over
appropriate ergodic observables and without appealing to utility functions, a price
range is seen to exist that is beneficial to both parties. Both the solid and dashed
lines lie above zero. What is typically defined as the “fair price,” the net premium, is
detrimental to any insurer of finite wealth (the dashed line is below zero at $1, 700 per
month), leading to bankruptcy with probability 1. Inset: horizontal axis extended to
$100,000. The non-linearity is clearly visible at these scales.
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This explains why the expectation-value criterion is sometimes a reasonable de-
scription of large insurers’ behaviour. Indeed, the assumption of risk neutrality for
the insurance firm in (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976) is consistent with the time
paradigm under multiplicative dynamics in the limit where the insurance fee and the
insured loss are small compared to the wealth of the insurer. Outside this regime in-
surers that “are concerned only with expected profits” (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976,
p. 631) will sooner or later go bankrupt because of excessive risk-taking. Any contract
with F > pL and L > Wins +F will appear attractive to a Rothschild-Stiglitz insurer
(δ 〈r〉ins > 0) but the loss will bankrupt the firm when it occurs (δg¯ins → −∞).
Consequently, the behaviour outside the regime where the total underwritten
risk is negligible compared to the insurer’s resources is not well described by the
maximisation of the expectation value of profits. Instead an actual insurance firm
(or other risk-bearer) will set a limit for the acceptable probability of its bankruptcy
over a given time interval, i.e. a risk tolerance, and explore the possible behavioural
choices within the resulting constraints, see e.g. (Kaas et al., 2008).
The difference apparent to (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976) between the shipowner
(appearing to act according to a non-linear, concave, utility function) and the insurer
(appearing risk neutral, i.e. appearing to act according to a linear utility function)
is simply a consequence of scale. At large wealth the possible logarithmic changes
in wealth are small enough for a linear approximation to the logarithm to be valid.
The insurer of infinite wealth can accept the net premium (the ensemble average of
the insured loss per time unit). The ensemble average is thus a limit that is often of
practical relevance.
4 Conclusion – business is when both parties gain
Figure 3 illustrates a remarkable difference to traditional actuarial thinking in eco-
nomics. According to the time paradigm there is a win-win regime where both parties
gain (both the solid and dashed lines are above zero). The net premium, often called
the “fair price” plays a less significant role – a range of prices is beneficial for both
parties. The fair price is never part of that range (it is the end of the range in the
limit of the infinitely wealthy insurer). Where exactly the price of trade will lie can
be negotiated.
This seems to be a more general result: if it is true that people choose based on
the physically sensible criterion of optimising growth over time, then a win-win range
of prices will exist for any service or product that is traded. Business deals happen
because both parties gain. This is the opposite of equilibrium thinking in economics,
which tells us that deals happen either because one party cons or coerces the other
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into an agreement, or because both parties found the exact price where neither has
a reason not to get involved.
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List of Symbols
C Replacement cost of the ship. 6, 7, 9, 11, 14, 17, 19
δg¯ins Change in the time average (and expectation value) of the dynamic-specific
growth rate of wealth (here exponential), experienced by the insurer when the
insurance contract is signed. 18, 20
δg¯own Change in the time average (and expectation value) of the dynamic-specific
growth rate of wealth (here exponential), experienced by the shipowner when
the insurance contract is signed. 18
δ 〈r〉ins Change in the rate of change of the expectation value of wealth, experienced
by the insurer when the insurance contract is signed. 8, 9, 20
δ 〈r〉own Change in the rate of change of the expectation value of wealth, experienced
by the shipowner when the insurance contract is signed. 7, 8, 9
δ 〈ru〉ins Change in the rate of change of the expectation value of utility, experienced
by the insurer when the insurance contract is signed. 14
δ 〈ru〉own Change in the rate of change of the expectation value of utility, experienced
by the shipowner when the insurance contract is signed. 13
∆U Change in utility over one round trip. 11
∆W Change in wealth over one round trip. 7
∆t Duration of one round trip. 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20
F Insurance fee. 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20
G Gain from one round trip of the ship. 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 17, 19
g¯ Time-average growth rate. 17, 19
g¯inins Time-average growth rate of the insurer’s wealth with insurance contract. 18
g¯unins Time-average growth rate of the insurer’s wealth without insurance contract.
18
g¯inown Time-average growth rate of the insured shipowner’s wealth. 17, 18
25
g¯unown Time-average growth rate of the uninsured shipowner’s wealth. 17, 18
L Insured loss. 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20
p Probability of losing the ship on one round trip. 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 13, 14, 17, 18,
19, 20
〈r〉 Rate of change of the expectation value. In discrete time, considered here, this is
also the expectation value of the rate of change because both the differencing in
computing the rate of change and the summing in computing the expectation
value are linear operations that commute. In continuous time we have to be
more careful because the rate of change ∆W
∆t
may not exist in the limit ∆t→ 0.
7, 9
〈r〉inins Rate of change of the expectation value of the insurer’s wealth with insurance
contract. 8, 9
〈r〉unins Rate of change of the expectation value of the insurer’s wealth without insur-
ance contract. 8, 9
〈ru〉 Rate of change of the expectation value of utility. 11, 14
〈r〉inown Rate of change of the expectation value of the insured shipowner’s wealth. 7,
9
〈r〉unown Rate of change of the expectation value of the uninsured shipowner’s wealth.
7, 9
〈ru〉inins Rate of change of the expectation value of the insurer’s utility with insurance
contract. 13, 14
〈ru〉unins Rate of change of the expectation value of the insurer’s utility without insur-
ance contract. 13, 14
〈ru〉inown Rate of change of the expectation value of the insured shipowner’s utility.
13
〈ru〉unown Rate of change of the expectation value of the uninsured shipowner’s utility.
11, 13
t Time when the goods leave Amsterdam. 7, 11, 17
26
U Utility function. 4, 11, 14
Uown Shipshipowner’s utility function. 11, 13, 14
Uins Insurer’s utility function. 14, 13
W Wealth. 4, 7, 11, 17
Wins Wealth of the insurer. 13, 14, 13, 18, 19, 20
Wown Wealth of the insurance buyer. 6, 11, 13, 14, 17, 19
27
